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I. Introduction: Language Set Free
The poem holds on at the edge of itself; so as to exist, it ceaselessly calls and hauls itself
from its Now-no-more back into its Ever-yet.
But this Ever-yet could only be an act of speaking. Not simply language and probably not
just verbal “correspondence” either.
But actualized language, set free under the sign of a radical individuation, which at the
same time stays mindful of the limits drawn by language, the possibilities opened by
language.
This Ever-yet of poems can only be found in a poem by someone who does not forget
that he speaks from the angle of inclination of his very being, his creatureliness.
—Paul Celan

Poetic expression constantly vacillates between its origin and its
completion: it dies the moment it is born out of the speaker—it is said, it is
done—but is continuously resurrected in the hearer or reader, so that, inasmuch as
the expression possesses an independent existence, it exists as a potentiality. It is
not in a fixed relationship with its meaning; rather, the meaning is cyclically
renewed as the sublation of the dialectic between the expression itself and the
consciousness that receives it. This is the distinction between poetic expression
and the mere ‘correspondence’ mentioned by Celan. The ‘correspondence’ is
directed, and remains linear; it has only one life and only one ‘correct’ meaning. It
seems, especially to its speaker, that it can only either be comprehended or
misunderstood against its intended meaning, with little or no grey area, while
poetic expression has about it an aura of meaningspace.
Poetic expression refers to more than simply poetry per se. Indeed, the
quotation above is from a speech entitled “The Meridian” that Paul Celan gave
when he was awarded the Georg Büchner Prize. The entire speech borders on the
surreal; it is a poem in paragraphs, as are myriad forms of expression that might
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be classified as something other than poetry per se. Indeed, each text that I
consider possesses qualities of poetic expression, whether it be Bruce Fink’s
clinical applications of Lacan’s theories on psychoanalysis, which I discuss when
I explore the psychoanalytic construction of subjecthood, or Chögyam Trungpa’s
inspired writings against an egoistically constructed spirituality, which are the
foundation for my discussion of the ego within Tibetan Buddhism. But one of the
most poetically inclined theoretical contributions to this project is arguably Gilles
Deleuze’s text on Bergsonism, parts of which cast a brilliant light on Paul Celan’s
words and offer a frame (though an elastic one, to be sure) for this entire project.
In the final chapter of his text, Deleuze explores and elucidates Bergson’s
conceptions of the possible, real,1 virtual and actual. In this model, the real
precedes and delimits what is considered the possible; in Deleuze’s words, what
becomes real (for the real and the possible are cyclically related to one another) is
“ready-made…pre-existent to itself,” and, he goes on to say, “[i]n fact, it is not
the real that resembles the possible, it is the possible that resembles the real.”
Current ‘realities’ condition future conceptions of the possible. “Possibility”
becomes an illusory concept, or as Deleuze says, it becomes “a false notion, the
source of false problems.” 2 It is not difficult to see how such a false notion would
give rise to false consciousness: perception built on delusions regarding what is—
or what can be—real. Countering false consciousness is the aim of most forms of
spirituality, though each has different considerations regarding what constitutes
1

This is not the same formulation of the real that will be used later in this paper; here, the term is
used strictly in Bergson’s, and subsequently Deleuze’s, sense.
2

Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism. (New York: Zone Books, 1988) 98.
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false consciousness and what comprises true consciousness, or enlightenment. I
would say (though this will probably be a contentious proclamation to many) that
most systems of self-awareness, such as psychoanalysis, are intrinsically spiritual,
as they reveal us—and what is not us—to ourselves and aid us in bringing a sense
of meaning to life, albeit not necessarily a cosmological one.
There is a system that is both spiritual prima facie and that closely
parallels psychoanalysis in many ways, which is Buddhism. In this paper, I will
be looking mainly at certain aspects of Tibetan Buddhism as well as English
translations of Buddhist texts originally written in Sanskrit, which serve as
foundational texts for a variety of the sects that have developed over time. False
consciousness as I describe it above is ultimately a Buddhist concept. In much
Buddhist thought, as we will see, false consciousness is associated with the
cultivation of, and identification with, an ego-self that perpetuates delusion in
order to preserve itself. This ego-self obscures a multidimensional, dynamic
Mindspace similar to Deleuze’s conception of the virtual.
For Bergson, and subsequently Deleuze, the virtual is, crucially, monistic:
it is the “point of unification,” a “totality” or “Whole.”3 As this virtual Whole is
actualized, or as it becomes actual, it follows what Deleuze calls the rules of
“difference or divergence and creation,” while the realization of the possible is
conditioned by “resemblance” and “limitation.”4 The virtual is linked to potential
rather than possibility, and though this distinction may at first glance seem merely
semantic, I think that when contemplated, it becomes clearer that possibility is in
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many ways a negative term: it immediately implies its opposite, impossibility,
which displays the ‘rule of limitation’ mentioned above. The ‘rule of
resemblance’ refers to the self-referential nature of the real/possible formulation.
Potential, on the other hand, is a more positive term with less prescriptive, more
generative connotations, exhibiting the rules of creative differentiation attributed
to actualization by Deleuze.
But what does this mean in terms of language? To answer this question, I
will turn again to Celan’s quotation: he speaks of “actualized language, set free
under the sign of a radical individuation.” This would imply that language, too,
springs from a virtual Wholeness, a virtual Babelian cacophony of Language, and
that it must also undergo a process by which it moves from virtuality into
actuality: the Language-potential is not language per se. From the simplest point
of view, actualization, inasmuch as it necessitates differentiation, splits language
into its various groupings: French, German, Swahili, and so forth. These
subgroups of Language comprise smaller components, with categories and
differentiated units overlapping as in a Venn diagram. But there is another, much
more crucial aspect to actualization without which the process is utterly
incomplete, which is its generative capability. Deleuze writes,
For what coexisted in the virtual ceases to coexist in the
actual and is distributed in lines or parts that cannot be
summed up, each one retaining the whole, except from a
certain perspective…These lines of differentiation are
therefore truly creative: They only actualize by
inventing, they create in these conditions the physical,
vital or psychical representative of the ontological level
that they embody.”5

5
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This is the real force of Celan’s quotation: actualized language is not simply
individuated, it is radically individuated, that is, as speech calls language out of
virtuality, it creates language anew in every moment of expression. When
language is spoken or received by one who is in some way aware6 of the entire
process of actualization, the creation as well as the differentiation—when spoken
by Celan, for example—language is set free: free from its function as sheer
signification, free from its oppressively direct correspondence to Things and
Ideas, free from its burdensome responsibility to reason and rationality, free to
dance, naked and joyous and shining, around the speaker to the rhythm of his
breath.
Celan addresses the issue of awareness directly in his quotation, when he
insists that the ‘Ever-yet’ of poems is only apparent to someone who “does not
forget that he speaks from the angle of inclination of his very being, his
creatureliness.” This ‘angle of inclination’ is the angle of each individual’s
trajectory from the foundation of Being; of animal existence. That is, it is the
particular way in which each creature is actualized, is pulled out of amorphous
virtuality, the differentiation that allows each person to be unique in actuality. It
does not describe identity or a personal, fated soul, rather, it describes merely the
plurality of human manifestation against the backdrop of undifferentiated
creaturehood. For identity, as we will come to understand throughout this paper, is
an artificial construction, a cancerous corruption of the angle of inclination

6

When I say ‘aware’ here, I do not mean that the speaker or receiver must necessarily express the
process in Deleuze’s or Celan’s terms, or that they must consciously follow the process step by
step, but rather that they intuit that language is more than simply a system of signification and take
joy in exploring and expressing that ‘more’.
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discussed by Celan. What is commonly considered as one’s identity is amassed,
more or less consciously, throughout a lifetime, while individuation simply
unfolds, or develops. It is a subtle yet extraordinarily significant distinction: Celan
is not urging that we simply be aware of the ways in which our personal identities
or subjectivities color our receptions and communications, but rather, that we
understand that every communication originates and terminates cyclically in the
very fact of our subjecthood. Language can only be ‘called out’ of virtuality by
those who understand that they themselves also underwent (and continue to
undergo) the process of actualization, even if they do not understand it in those
particular terms. We need to understand ourselves first as creatures before we can
elevate ourselves as creators.
But what constitutes our creatureliness? What comprises us, not
physiologically, but psychologically and, indeed, spiritually? There are myriad
answers, and no one, including myself, can offer anything other than suggestions
and partial explanations. But if we acknowledge that our understanding is
incomplete and varied—indeed, if we celebrate that incompleteness—we can
begin to approach our selves and our expressions as elastic constellations: bodies
of moments, bodies of words and sounds and light and space, dynamic and
infinitely, infinitely open.
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II(a). Constructing the Self: The Psychoanalytic Subject
When ‘I’ speak (or write, express, and so forth), who or what is actually
speaking? It would be convenient if this ‘I’ could refer to a single, unified, and
neatly packaged individual consciousness, some individual point of reference.
And yet, this does not appear to be the case. The poet Arthur Rimbaud said
famously “The I is an other” (“Je est un autre”) in a letter to Paul Demeny.7 When
he said this, Rimbaud could not have known that he was articulating one of the
fundamental tenets of Lacanian thought. This utterance implies, at least in part,
that the ‘I’ of speech refers to only a portion of that which constitutes what is
generally thought of as a [unified] self. Lacan writes, “The point is not to know
whether I speak of myself in a way that conforms to what I am, but rather to know
whether, when I speak of myself, I am the same as the self of whom I speak.”8 In
fact, ‘I’ am not the same as this self of enunciation.
Indeed “self” itself is an especially problematic term, because, as (in
common parlance) it points to an illusory unification, it is deceptively vague.
However, I believe I can actually make good use of this vagueness if I use it
deliberately, pointedly, and so from this point onward, when I use the term ‘self’
it will be specifically to signify this illusory unification, the sum of the parts as it
were.
Specifically, the ‘I’ of speech refers to the ego—the portion of the self that
is formed during the early stages of life in what Lacan calls the “mirror phase.”
7

Arthur Rimbaud and Claude Jeancolas, Les lettres manuscrites de Rimbaud. (Paris : Textuel,
1997).
8
Jacques Lacan, Ecrits. (New York: Norton Books, 1999) 430.
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The mirror phase, which occurs at around six to eighteen months of age, describes
the point at which the child locates her identity in an image that is external to her:
her own reflection. The reflection becomes for the child the “ideal ego” (not to be
confused with the “ego-ideal”), that is, the child’s own image comes to fascinate
her and she becomes convinced that she is this very image and that it is this
image, this self-as-image, that the child’s mother finds desirable enough for her to
provide the child with the necessary care. This marks the beginning of the
fascination with the self as such, and particularly with the self as separate, and
vulnerable in its separation. This fascination becomes a preoccupation with selfpreservation, not simply against pain or death, but for the selfhood, or identity.
A problem then inevitably develops when the child comes to realize that
this image only succeeds in ‘winning’ the parent’s affection, so to speak, when it
conforms to the desire of the parent—that this “ideal ego” must succumb to an
“ego-ideal” represented by and structured by the parents’ desire (for the child to
do certain things at certain times, to act in certain ways, and so forth). In addition,
the child perceives not only that her mother desires, but also that there is
something other than the child herself that her mother desires; that the child alone
is not sufficient to (ful)fill her mother’s desire.
In fact, nothing is sufficient to fulfill desire. ‘Lack’ is fundamental. We
lack, and therefore we desire, and in many senses, therefore we live dynamically
rather than merely existing in stasis. In Freud’s thought, this dynamic quality is
attributed to the force of Eros, which he opposes to what he labels the death
instinct. In Lacan’s thought, life is completely based upon desire—it is easy to
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discern an associative or connotative link between the two terms, Eros and desire.
Despite the common usage of the term, desire in this sense is not exclusively
sexual and does not signify fleshlust, though desire can (and does) certainly
manifest in that way.
Rather, ‘desire’ describes our search for something that can fill our lack, a
doomed quest—for since lack is fundamental by definition, nothing can
compensate for it. This is the agony of desire—the familiar experience of not
wanting something once you get it no matter how preoccupied you were with
desiring it. Desire absolutely cannot be satisfied; for both Freud and Lacan,
complete satisfaction signifies death. But inevitably, in spite of the overwhelming
evidence to the contrary, we cling to the belief that desire can be satisfied if only
we had this, or that, thus setting ourselves up for constant and often devastating
disappointment. It is in this disappointment that life as most of us know it is
constituted: every disappointment triggers another cycle of desire, for while desire
can manifest as conscious want, its origin is largely unconscious. Desire does not
succumb to rationality; it does not wither in the face of disappointment or
perceived impossibility as we might sometimes consciously attempt to force it to,
because desire remains largely unknown to us. It is rather like a dandelion: the
part above the surface, exposed to consciousness, is only the scantest portion of
the whole, while the root system remains underground. And, as with a dandelion,
eradicating the visible portion does nothing to prevent the root from generating
another stalk. Certain egoistic approaches to meditation (as, for example, in the
elementary stages of Buddhist meditation, before some degree of enlightenment
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or ego-dismantling has been achieved, or as in some New Age affirmation and
visualization techniques, among others), only address desire’s stalk rather than its
root, and if the subject is not careful, she becomes fascinated with the very act of
perpetually cutting the stalk and fails to do any actual uprooting. She becomes, in
other words, caught in the critical tension between desire and satisfaction, desire
and annihilation.
So we are compelled to act by desires that remain largely unknown to us,
buried in the earth of the unconscious. Perhaps we catch glimpses in struggles
with inclinations that seem alien to us, and yet, which we cannot seem to put out
of our minds, inclinations that drive us to do things that we do not seem to want to
do with our conscious minds, as certain people experience when they cheat on
their spouses, or others when they sabotage their own would-be successes by
doing anything from oversleeping at particularly inopportune times to walking
away at the last minute from situations in which they fully intended to participate.
Ultimately, what we learn from the constant cycle of desire and
disappointment is that the disappointment is inevitable because what we actually
desire is to desire, not to be satisfied. In its strongest manifestations desire elicits
in us a desperate longing that is at once experienced as a lack, an emptiness that
must be filled, but that is also strangely scintillating and utterly fascinating to its
subject. This simultaneous experience of extreme hunger and intense satisfaction
is what Lacan refers to as jouissance.
While attempting to meditate one day, certain thoughts that I wrote down
at the time in a notebook brought me to a greater, more tangible understanding of
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jouissance. I am quoting the following passage more or less directly instead of
immediately translating it into academic discourse because I think the revelatory
nature of the experience is significant:
Meditation reveals to me the agony of walking the edge of a precipice—
the agony of wanting to fall because falling would kill the fear of falling; falling
would kill the agony of walking the edge. In sitting [meditation], ‘falling’ would
be coming out of meditation—it is almost meditating successfully that one is
afraid of because it extends the agonizing fear of ‘failing’ to meditate. During the
day, all I want to do is meditate, but when I actually sit down, I want to do
anything but, even though the desire to meditate is still there, so the desire to get
up and the desire to sit create an agonizing struggle, sometimes causing my eyes
to pop open without my even being conscious of it. The suspension of the agony of
continuing to sit—of succeeding to remain in agony—this can only be
characterized as jouissance…
The struggle with falling is in direct correlation to the relationship
between Eros and the death instinct in Freudian thought. Freud describes Eros as a
“sexual instinct” but goes on to say that it can also signify the instinct toward selfpreservation. The death instinct is sadistic, a collection of “destructive impulses.”9
In the precipice scenario above, Eros would manifest as the desire to successfully
walk the edge, while the death instinct would quite literally manifest as the desire
to fall. Falling can be seen as a result of the unconscious causing the body to
waver and shake (seemingly) uncontrollably. Jouissance manifests as the

9

Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id. (New York: Norton Books, 1960) 36-39.
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overwhelming yet ecstatic strain that results from the perpetual struggle between
Eros and what I will call the death instinct.10 The ego seems to be theoretically
situated between these two forces, acting as a kind of mediator: when the strain
becomes too great by the ego’s measure, it acts to distract, to deflect, to provide
an outlet for the energy that builds up like heat between two palms rubbing
together. This outlet can be, among other things, an outburst of anger or
frustration, or it can be orgasm.
It is the ego, then, that thwarts meditation in a bid for its own survival.
Meditation is a process by which the ego can be dissipated or shattered, and far
from being a passive participant in this process, the ego manipulates both the
other aspects of the self, and external objects and phenomena for the purpose of
sustaining itself and maintaining a semblance of power over the rest of the self.
As Bruce Fink describes the ego in one of his texts on Lacan, “The consciously
thinking subject is, by and large, indistinguishable from the ego …” and “the ego,
according to Lacan, arises as a crystallization or sedimentation of ideal images,
tantamount to a fixed, reified object with which the child learns to identify…”11
The identification with the ego described here by Fink is exactly what occurs in
the mirror stage of development discussed above.
The fact that, as Fink goes on to say, the ego is the “seat of fixation and
narcissistic attachment” and a “repository of misunderstanding,”12 implies further
that our thoughts, our conscious, rationalizing, categorizing minds, are largely
10

After Freud. Though others have gone on to label the death instinct “Thanatos,” I could find no
such reference in Freud’s work and could subsequently conceive of no real reason to employ the
term myself.
11
Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995) 36.
12
Fink 37
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illusory figments of our imaginations designed to compact us and cushion us
against both the external world and, in a sense, our own jouissance. The
unbearable tension of jouissance arises only in dichotomy with the ego, and the
ego wants to thwart it because it is the very experience or apprehension by the
other aspects of ‘self’ of the ego’s fault lines as it were; its weakness or, in
Lacanian terms, its lack. In meditation specifically, jouissance is a manifestation
of the ego’s resistance to the process of its own dismantling. Breaking the
meditation (or meditation attempt) also breaks the tension, and while this can
induce a feeling of relief, it constitutes an acquiescence to the ego’s resistance.
To understand how the ego performs its protective functions, we need to
understand the relationship of the ego to the rest of the self, namely, to the
unconscious. Lacan said that the unconscious is the discourse of the Other13 and
that this Other is the Symbolic, or language. The significance of this should not be
underplayed. A person’s unconscious dictates to an extreme extent that person’s
actions, speech, his wants and desires, and his relationships, both romantic and
platonic. The conscious mind thinks itself to be in control of most of these aspects
of life. In fact, its primary function is to rationalize (often through disavowal) or
qualify the choices that actually flow from the unconscious as water from an
underground spring, or as light from a small crack in the door.
This is not to say that the unconscious is the “real” or “true” subject or
self, obscured by the ego and drowned out by the din of the conscious mind.
Every aspect of the self is tenuous, every aspect lacks stasis, and in some way
eludes signification, including the unconscious. This elusion is due to the very
13
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nature of language: language as the Symbolic precludes the Real, that which
logically precedes the Symbolic, or in other words, that which signifiers
theoretically reference, though this referential relationship is obviously largely
illusory. In fact, the Symbolic overtakes and supercedes the Real, renders it a
mere fanciful idea that trails behind the feet of the Symbolic, a shadow.
Fink describes the Lacanian conception of the unconscious as a “continual
playing out of a signifying chain excluded from consciousness, in which
knowledge of a certain kind is embodied, is permanent in nature; in other words,
it subsists throughout an individual’s life.”14 The unconscious is made up of the
pieces of information and communication that have been lost to the conscious
mind, that did not fit there per se. These ‘pieces,’ then, can only be signifiers,
rather than the emotions or unsignified impulses that many imagine to constitute
the unconscious.
That these pieces are left over from a person’s own experience explains
why each person’s unconscious affects them differently, and appears to constitute
him as some kind of Real ‘individual’ while all the time actually being strictly
structured by the Symbolic, a condition which precludes such Real individuality.
Indeed, Fink states this unequivocally: “Now this ‘other’ subject…is not
something which or someone who has some sort of permanent existence: it only
appears when a propitious occasion presents itself. It is not some kind of
underlying substance or substratum.”15

14
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The ego, then, acts as a lens, warping and manipulating the material of the
unconscious (what, in the model of the lens, could be considered as the ‘light’ that
passes through) when a “propitious occasion” allows portions of its material to
manifest in the conscious mind. In a sense, the ego serves to naturalize the
contents of the unconscious so that a person cannot discern the linguistically
structured nature of her desire. Instead, she feels her thoughts and actions to
belong to her in some fundamental way, to constitute something that can be called
an identity, something that is unique to her. Paradoxically, such identities are
usually attached to signifiers, they have labels, and these labels affect—these
labels actually set the course for—the ways in which these identities manifest in a
person. In other words, these identities are absolutely linguistically structured.
Slavoj Žižek writes, “One does something, one counts oneself as (declares
oneself) the one who did it, and, on the base of this declaration, one does
something new—the proper moment of subjective transformation occurs at the
moment of declaration, not at the moment of the act.”16 It is important to consider
the fact that such “declarations” do not have to occur at a social level, or even at
the level of speech, but indeed actually occur most often at the level of thought:
we constantly declare ourselves to ourselves, a process by which we are
continuously reified as “individuals,” or “personalities.” Not only this, but, as
Žižek notes, it is a process that structures, rather than describes, how we act and
speak.

16
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It should be obvious by now that the ego’s role in this process of
reification is far from incidental. However, Fink is careful to point out that “in
Lacan’s version of psychoanalysis the ego is clearly not an active agent, the agent
of interest being the unconscious.”17 This is why I have referred to the ego as a
“lens,” something that can passively manipulate that which passes through it. It
could also be thought of as a prism, something that bends and deconstructs a
blended beam so its components may be discernable to the conscious eye.
However, this image should not lead one to believe that the ego’s function is
organizational in some kind of objectively correct way, for, to reiterate, “the ego
is…a repository of misunderstanding” more akin to a broken mirror.18
Self, then, in the psychoanalytic sense, is an empty signifier, pointing
toward a unity that simply does not exist as such. Rather than being a whole that
is “greater than the sum of its parts,” as the saying goes, we are in fact almost less
than the sums of our parts. Our parts eclipse ‘us,’ dissolve ‘us,’ stand in ‘our’
places like so many cardboard cutouts. Each aspect of the ‘self’ signifies only the
very impossibility of the existence of a unified, concrete ‘self.’ Superficially, one
could say this is true of all aspects of the self except for the ego, the function of
which is to signify this exact possibility of unity, and even to signify this
possibility as an already-present reality. However, we must remember that the ego
would in fact be completely superfluous if such a possibility were ‘real,’ for if the
‘self’ were actually unified and concrete, we would not need the ego to
continuously convince us of that fact.

17
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II(b). Constructing the Self: The Buddhist Subject
There is the ego, and there is something else. Something that the ego is
other from, something untouchable and unchanging. Something that is not the
“actions, the mental events.”19 Something that is not anguish or pride, or selfdoubt. But what, then, is it? Before attempting to elucidate what this “other”
might consist of, I think it is important to grasp what indeed is meant by “ego” in
this slightly different context. It might seem as though the ego is identifiable or
synonymous with the subject, that which comprises the actual self. However, in
Buddhist ideology, the ego is seen as something illusory that is, paradoxically, to
be cut away so that one’s true nature20 might be discovered. The judging ego is a
“level of complication that takes us a long way from the basic simplicity of what
we are.”21 The ego is craving, the ego is punishment, the ego is worry, and,
perhaps most significantly, the ego is thought and most speech. It is elusive and
quite difficult to discuss academically. It is like a garment to be worn into the
world, but one so intricate and worn so often it has become confused with the
naked skin. We have forgotten what we are beneath the splendid robes we have
woven. And the robe itself is constructed of so many beautiful and varying layers
that even in trying to strip it off we grow confused as to what is actually beneath
it.
One of the most poignant aspects of Buddhism as a spiritual (rather than
purely philosophical) tradition is that it actually provides a method for slicing
19

Chögyam Trungpa, Cutting Through Spiritual Materialism. (Boston: Shambala, 1973) 70.
Not to be confused with true self; it’s simply a way of distinguishing between the ego and the
‘Essential Mind’ beneath it, which will be discussed in greater detail later.
21
Trungpa 15
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through the layers of ego (as does the Western practice of psychoanalysis). Most
sects of Buddhism, including the three vehicles of Tibetan Buddhism,22 focus
more on right action than on subscription to delineated beliefs. It is a testament,
then, to ego’s power that despite thousands of years of development, even the
method that Buddhism employs is far from failsafe: “The problem is that ego can
convert anything to its own use, even spirituality,” Kagyu lineage-holder
Chögyam Trungpa writes in his 1973 text Cutting Through Spiritual Materialism.
The ego is destructively clever, appropriating everything, even attempts to
undermine it, in order to strengthen itself.23
Ego develops from what Trungpa calls the “basic ground,”24 a state (or
perhaps more accurately, space) characterized by openness and spontaneity.
Trungpa relates this basic ground to the state of innocence before the fall in
traditional Judeo-Christian mythology; in psychoanalysis, this may correspond to
the experience of being in utero, to Lacan’s pre-alienation ‘Real,’ or, in some
ways, to Freud’s conception of the ‘oceanic feeling.’ Trungpa asserts that we still
experience—if only unconsciously, as it would be too instantaneous and elusive
to capture with the mind—this state sometimes when we see some thing with
which we are not familiar. Just before we try to make sense of it by categorizing
it, we perceive it as it is, even if only for an instant. It is the space between
perception and conceptualization. It is not void, per se, but a space in which to

22

The ‘three vehicles’ refers to the Hinayana, Mahayana, and Vajrayana paths. In simple terms,
they are the easy path, the middle way, and the diamond or hard path, respectively, and they differ
subtly in method but have similar aspects and the same goals—like three sides of one tetrahedron.
23
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move freely rather than a structured space; a space that inherently includes a sort
of “primordial intelligence.”25
In Trungpa’s model, at the very beginning, in infanthood, ‘I’ and this
space are indistinguishable. Infants are not immediately self-conscious, rather,
self-consciousness is a result of becoming increasingly active in the space; of
interacting with the space through our senses. At some point, “we begin to spin
more than was necessary to express the space.”26 So, it seems to be a matter of the
space and the ‘self’ beginning in a state not of utter indiscernibility, but of
symbiosis, co-operation. We are like liquid in a container—if we are still, or if we
only move about within the container, we conform to the container and seem
indistinguishable from it, but if we become too active and slosh over the sides, we
realize that we are separate. There may seem to be a problem with this metaphor:
the container is a structured space whereas “basic ground” is supposed to be
utterly open, but in fact, the moment we become self-conscious, the space
solidifies. This is the introduction of duality to the consciousness, the experience
that ‘I’ am separate from ‘space.’ As Trungpa says, this is the birth of “form,” of
“other.”27 It is also, therefore, the birth of ego.
So ego represents a sort of fundamental illusion, a fundamental ignorance
of what we are in fact. It is an impulse to define our selves as ‘individual,’ to be
uniquely significant in some way, to push toward ever-increasing separation. It
becomes increasingly elaborate as it develops, employing emotion and concept to
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prop it up, channeling the primordial intelligence of the basic ground into a logicbased intellectual intelligence.28
The ego, then, is tricky. It cannot accurately be called ‘real,’ because it is a
construct and it cannot accurately be called ‘unreal’ because it exists; because, if
left unchecked, it determines our actions and communications, and therefore our
lives and societies. It is too powerful to be simply unreal, much like the concept
of God. But whether one wants to label ego ‘real’ or not, what is actually
significant is simply that it is not fundamentally what we are. The Bodhisattva, or
one who seeks enlightenment in the Buddhist sense, must acknowledge that all
beings are essentially ego-less. That is to say, nothing possesses an essential
selfhood or personality; nothing exists as an independent, concrete unit. This is an
interesting paradox: the ego is not supposed to exist—again, even in Lacan’s
conception of the ego, it has no agency—and yet ‘it’ exerts a staggering influence
upon us. In fact, most of the mental processes of which we are aware—that is, the
contents of our conscious minds—are either wholly produced or mitigated by the
ego. How could it simply not exist? Finding the solution requires resisting the
inclination to reify such terms as “exist” and “not exist.” In reality, the ego is
neither existent nor nonexistent. The ego is an illusion, which effectively amounts
dialectically to a third classification of Being: something that does not ‘exist’ but
still influences. It is similar in many ways to Deleuze’s conception of the virtual,
that which exists, but as potentiality, except that the ego, rather than undergoing
actualization in the Deleuzian sense, has been misidentified as real, as it is
mistakenly assumed to be the source of consciousness (I think, therefore I am),
28
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and therefore the source of possibility and impossibility; the source of judgments
pertaining to reality.
Trungpa repeatedly characterizes the mind and the ego (as the mind is, in
effect, the seat of the ego) as neurotic. It is as if the ego is somehow aware of how
tenuous it is, as though constantly reasserting its control over the mind is not
enough for it—it must also ensure that the mind does nothing to flush it out, as we
saw in the discussion of jouissance. Like a parasite, everything we take in feeds
the ego, though we might think we are feeding ourselves, and we are always left
hungry, unsatisfied by what we take in. As the solidification of the ego progresses
over time, so does our hunger, and we grow increasingly jealous, often sabotaging
relationships in order to preserve our egos. The ego does not easily accept blame,
it does not want to come up short, and so it justifies itself using emotion and
intellect in order to protect its self against the challenges that an other inevitably
poses to it. But preserving the ego essentially maintains our hunger: the
(unenlightened) Buddhist subject, like the psychoanalytic subject, is constituted
by desire. This constant defensiveness creates anxiety that for many people
borders on unbearable, and it is not difficult to comprehend how this anxiety
could give way to neurosis.
Generally speaking, most communication serves only to further reinforce
the ego. ‘We’ speak to convince others and our selves that we are solid, real
entities, and positive, morally justified entities at that. We communicate in
different ways depending on ‘who’ we are trying to solidify ourselves as being.
“Usually when we communicate with another person, we are driven by a kind of
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neurotic speed.”29 We build a kind of cocoon when speaking and are impelled to
render it impenetrable, often using logic to make something inarguable that
another listener might feel intuitively is off. When used this way, language is one
of the most effective tools of the ego, especially in a society in which logic and
rationality are prized above most other virtues.
In this context, linguistic expression is reduced to the manipulation of
certain symbols for the neurotic purpose of creating, reinforcing, or even
elevating, oneself. The communication in question does not have to be of a
particularly grandiose nature for this to occur, rather, it happens in even the most
mundane interactions. When relating events to a friend, for example, one often
uses words in such a way as to put a particular slant on the story, so that the
perceived antagonist of the situation may seem more solidly abusive, or pompous,
or envious, and so forth. It is usually extremely subtle, so much so that a third
party observing both the initial situation and the recounting might not even be
able to call the story inaccurate, but would simply chalk the discrepancies up to
differences in interpretation.
Interpretation is almost entirely ego-driven: “Whenever we begin to feel
any discrepancy or conflict between our actions and the teachings, we
immediately interpret the situation in such a way that the conflict is smoothed
over.”30 One could replace “the teachings” (here intended to mean Buddhist
teachings) with almost any doctrine. The idea of ego-as-interpreter is essentially
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the basis for the belief that one needs a “spiritual friend” or guru to aid one on the
Buddhist path: “written teachings are always open to the interpretation of ego.”31
This is simple enough to consider. Much more difficult is figuring out how
to avoid participating in such interpretation, as the ego is quite skilled at
masquerading interpretation as simple comprehension. Susan Sontag’s essay
Against Interpretation offers a perspective that, though not Buddhist per se, has
much in common with Trungpa’s elucidation of the subject. Of interpretation
Sontag writes: “It makes art into an article for use, for arrangement into a mental
scheme of categories.”32 One could replace “art” with almost any word one
wished, for the function of the ego in Buddhist ideology as interpretative agent
quantifies and categorizes everything in order to transform the world from a
chaotic mass into concise, manageable portions.
This process inevitably entails massive oversimplification of the
complexities inherent in [R]eality. And the ego certainly does not oversimplify
objectively; rather, it oversimplifies, or interprets, in a way that serves (either
positively or negatively) the neuroses and desires that were formed by the ego in
the first place. The ego-as-lens, or the ego-as-broken-mirror, warps everything
along a similar trajectory, thus causing the illusion of unity, and often of nearstasis, among the (actually dynamic) aspects of the ‘self.’ It is not uncommon in
Buddhist thought for the illusory nature of the ego to be associated with the
deluding qualities of some forms of linguistic interchange, as in the Lankavatara
Scripture, when the Buddha says,
31
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“It is this combination of discrimination of
imaginary marks of individuality, grouping them
and giving them a name and becoming attached to
them as objects, by reason of habit-energy that has
been accumulated since beginningless time, that one
builds up erroneous views whose only basis is falseimagination. For this reason, Bodhisattvas should
avoid all discussions relating to assertions and
negations whose only basis is words and logic.”33
Here Buddha cautions against the use of rhetoric by the ego, the use of language
only to signify Things and Ideas, to establish and perpetuate rationality.
In the Surangama Sutra,34 Gotama Buddha offers a more extensive
elucidation on the illusory nature of selfhood and the processes of the conscious,
rational mind. The metaphor he employs deals, unsurprisingly, with language and
more specifically, with the physiological effects that words can induce: the saliva
the mouth produces when one speaks about sour plums or the way the body
wavers when the mind thinks of falling. The ego acts on the mind and the body
like a word. Even the seemingly visceral aspects of conscious experience—as
opposed to thought, which is more difficult to qualify or describe as a
commonality—have their bases in the self- or ego-illusion.
For example, to our conscious minds, sensory information is seemingly
divided physiologically by virtue of the various sense organs and we perceive
such information as belonging to, or corresponding with, its respective body part.
Indeed, the senses are usually taken for granted as fundamental, and perceptions
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based on the senses are often considered inarguably concrete. However, in the
Surangama Sutra, the Buddha asserts that this is an illusory understanding of
sense perception cultivated by the thinking mind (or ego) in (what I shall call) its
campaign for organized selfhood. Empirical information gathered from the
senses, therefore, is not to be taken for granted as representing some kind of
objective, observable ‘fact.’ In the unenlightened subject, then, the senses serve
mainly as tools for the ego, and as such, they both condition that subject’s
reactions to her environment and help to continuously trigger her desire.
While the unenlightened Buddhist subject is ego-driven and constituted by
an insatiable desire, the enlightened Buddhist subject is another matter.
Enlightenment is simply the process of dissolving the ego-illusion: The
Bodhisattva comes to understand that the web of associations and dualities that
the thinking mind comprises is an overgrown tangle that obscures what the
scriptures alternately call the Intuitive Mind, the Essential Mind, and the
Enlightening Essence of Mind, among other similar titles. In this Mind,
knowledge does not result from information gathered from the various sense
organs and organized by the rational mind. Instead, knowledge arises intuitively
by virtue of the essential clarity of the Mind once the thicket of associations is cut
through and pulled away.35
This Essential Mind is not a god or even an underlying universal self, like
the atman-brahman construction in some forms of Hinduism. Despite its English
title, it does not even really constitute an essence in the strict sense of the word: it
is not a ‘fundamental nature,’ nor does it possess any ‘inherent characteristics,’
35
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for both of these terms imply differentiation. The Essential Mind is, essentially,
empty. That is not to say that it is not-full; it does not imply a duality. The
corresponding Sanskrit term is sunyata, which expresses the paradigm, “form is
emptiness and emptiness is form.” This should not be understood as some kind of
koan, or alternately as some vague statement that implies that “everything is one,”
or something of the sort. Rather, sunyata expresses the emptiness of all concepts
of form, form as being devoid of any inherent meaning or significance, any
identity, or ego—and this includes signifiers, such as “emptiness,” or “sunyata,”
itself. However, the term also expresses the fact that in our rational minds,
emptiness itself also becomes a form, takes on the solidity of a concept. Through
its dual connotation, the term signifies an emptiness that remains tenuously
unconceptualized. The Essential Mind, then, exists as unreified, undifferentiated,
virtual space. It is what I will later describe as “awareness-without-self.”
The Buddha describes Essential Mind as a handkerchief, comprised of
many threads that form one fabric, and compares the senses and the thinking mind
to knots tied in the handkerchief.36 Buddhist meditation practices and,
subsequently, the process of enlightenment serve, in effect, to untie the knots in
order to restore the Essential Mind to its essential[ly empty] form. While the path
offered by Buddhism (in its various forms and sects) consists of extremely
specific rituals and ideologies, there are myriad ways to begin dismantling the ego
and restoring joyful, clear awareness to the Mind. One of these ways—the one
that I will discuss in the next section of this paper—is to reassess and revise our
relationships to language. For it is through language that we communicate both to
36
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each other and ourselves, and it is through language that we differentiate Things
from one another. When linguistic expression serves the ego, the differentiated
units become reified and help to propel the cycle of delusion and desire. But, as
we will see, this does not have to be the case.
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III. The Spiritual Value of Poetic Expression
I said above that we speak to convince our selves and others of our
enduring solidity, our person-ality, our specific selfhood; I said, in other words,
that communication generally serves the purposes of the ego. However, I am
inclined to believe that this has more to do with the trajectory that most
communication follows—the ego-lens through which it is projected—than with
some fundamental quality of communication or of language. For though Lacan
tells us that it is essentially the unconscious that speaks, if the ego conditions
sensory perception and rational thought, it is not too far a leap to say that it
conditions speech as well (remember Lacan’s image of the ego-as-sieve).
However, Buddha notes in the Surangama Sutra that the senses have
transcendental potential, as does the thinking mind. Might not speech, or
linguistic communication in general, also carry with it the potential for
transcendental existence?
It is important here to note that, especially in the Buddhist sense, but for
my own purposes also, the term “transcendental” does not imply that these
aspects are somehow separate from or dualistically counter to the ego-based
processes. Instead, I would recall the image of the handkerchief used in section II
to represent the Essential Mind—the handkerchief in its simplest, unknotted form
is what is thought of as transcendental here.
The Buddha discusses transcendental sight in the Surangama Sutra, first
describing how what I will call ego-sight involves perceiving sights through the
lenses both of one’s past conditioning and the subsequent desires created by it. He
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goes on to say that in so-called transcendental sight, “when you let your eyes
perceive anything, if you let the sensation of seeing pass unheeded, not letting any
discriminating thoughts of judgment arise in your mind, this unties all knots and is
the genuine freedom…”37 It is possible to have a similar relationship to words, to
language. Words can pass through the mind and over the lips, or out of the
fingers, just as visions of objects can pass through the eyes and back into the
mind. For just as words serve as placeholders for Concepts and Things, so do
sights. The non-transcendental vision of an object is already not-the-object-itself
but is, rather, immediately an idea of the object and, as I suggested above, the
same holds true for sounds, for smells, sensations of touch—no experience is
purely empirical. This idea is not wholly novel to Western thought. Indeed, in
Book VII of his Seminar Lacan says, “A sensory apparatus, Freud tells us, doesn’t
only play the role of extinguisher or of shock-absorber…but also plays the role of
sieve.”38 Words are not anomalous; they alone do not alienate us from experience
or from some undifferentiated ‘Reality’ any more than does the rest of our egoselves. The ego just has not found it quite as easy to appropriate, assimilate, and
naturalize language as it has the seemingly empirical aspects of Being.
In actuality, in the Buddhist sense, there is no objective order of reality
from which words can alienate us. We must recall sunyata (form is emptiness;
emptiness is form) to even begin to comprehend this. Even without, or perhaps
rather before language, all that exists of reality are our concepts of it. The thinking
mind precedes language; if it did not, how could it acquire and assimilate
37
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language in the first place? Lacan, for one, developed vast theories based on the
perceptions of infants, especially regarding their relationships to their mothers,
before they really encounter language. Even many animals, specifically mammals,
harbor impressions of the world that create myriad realities, as evidenced by the
behavior of those who have been abused or mistreated, versus those who have
not.
Therefore, words, while they stand for Things, stand for Things that do
not in fact exist as such; that are not concrete or objective, even in the prelinguistic sphere. In the Lankavatara Scripture, the Buddha tells his disciple
Mahamati, “Discrimination of meaning is based upon the false-imagination that
these sweet sounds which we call words and which are dependent upon whatever
subjects they are supposed to stand for, and which subjects are supposed to be
self-existent, all of which is based on error [sic]”39 (emphasis added). Alternately,
in the Diamond Sutra, the Buddha tells disciple Subhuti repeatedly that when he
uses words to communicate, he intends them only as a “figure of speech,” going
on to say, “But, Subhuti, as soon as I have spoken of these Buddhas and their
Dharmas, I must recall the words, for there are no Buddhas and no Dharmas.”40
When used in certain ways, words can actually express their own tenuousness and
impermanence; it is the ego that clings to words as having permanent, objective
meanings, or signifying concrete aspects of reality.
If, as in many of the Buddhist sutras, the thinking mind is viewed as the
sixth sense, then language is a kind of seventh, and Lacan’s vision of the
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unconscious as being structured by the Symbolic, or language, makes as much
sense and seems as obvious as the statement that our conscious experience is
structured by our other six senses. Perhaps it will be argued that what are
commonly considered the five senses can rightly be called “senses” as such
because they have a physiological basis, or because they are fundamental and do
not have to be learned or acquired in the way that language does. However, the
perceptions produced by sensory organs vary incredibly from human to human;
also, these perceptions are often learned and shared culturally: preferences for
certain flavors, or differing definitions of beauty. While grammar, reading, and
writing must generally be studied and learned scholastically, verbal
communication is adopted at an extremely young age and, at least in the case of
one’s primary language, is acquired through a process that is largely inscrutable to
those undergoing it. Children have the sense to mimic many of the words they
hear spoken by adults, and to understand both that words are not just sounds—that
they carry or point toward ‘meaning’—and that the linguistic system is more than
the sum of its signifiers: children learn early how to use the words they know to
structure new and varied sentences. Language is not an external tool or object that
we pick up and utilize, it is part of our very being.
Language, then, is not merely the ego’s plaything. In fact, in many ways
ego is terrified of language: of what it can reveal and of how powerful it can
actually be. When linguistic expression resonates with a hearer, or a reader, the
affective bond that is formed between that reader and that expression can be so
profound as to elicit a physiological response, in the form of tears, or laughter,
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chills, or supreme joy. And while the other senses reel in and assimilate bits of
information like spun sugar around a paper stick, serving, as I mentioned earlier,
to build some illusory opacity or solidity that can be labeled a “self,” the
expressive language-sense reaches out from somewhere ‘behind’41 this opacity. It
has the potential to penetrate the limits of the expresser’s opacity and, rarely but
magnificently, to breach the limit of the other’s as well—that is, to shatter egoselfhood, and expose it not only as illusory, but as unnecessary and actually
antithetical to true, fulfilling expression. Linguistic expression is how we come to
understand one another, and while much communication occurs among egos, that
which does not serves only to help decimate them.
Thus the ego’s aversion. But so pervasive is language and so necessary is
some form or degree of linguistic expression that ego cannot simply resist or
ignore it. Instead, it must find a way to subjugate language, to use it for ego’s own
preservation. Fink writes of the disparity between ego discourse, which is directed
toward constructing and discussing an ‘I’ or self, and unconscious discourse,
which, as I mentioned above, consists of repressed signifiers and portions of
signifiers. This latter discourse often inserts itself, quite uninvited, into ego
discourse in the form of slips of the tongue and in signifiers that appear in
dreams.42 The ego does this by turning language on itself, which is the point at
which words become fodder both for rhetoric, used to manipulate people’s
emotions, and logic games, used to prove ‘truths’ that are at best contrived and at
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worst oppressive, constituting a kind of violence. Luce Irigaray discusses the
issue in terms of gender difference when she writes that men, and subsequently
male discourse, are “structured in accordance with civil and religious norms that
drastically reduce and transform reality” by excluding or disappearing the
feminine.43
Similar dynamics are at work in any uneven exchange, whether the
discrepancy be educational, or economic, or so forth. Even when the ‘self’ is
interacting among itself, the exchange can be uneven. The ego attempts to exact
destruction or at least subjugation on the aspects of self that it cannot fully
incorporate. It uses its powers of rationalization and interpretation to bring the
disparate aspects under its control: sometimes by referring to a moral authority
that seems to require those aspects to be hated and repented; sometimes by
belittling and disavowing them as ‘stupid’ or ‘childish,’ though of course there are
even myriad other ways in which ego-violence manifests. Ego approaches the
other in much the same way as it approaches the disparate elements of the self. It
sees the other as a threat to its solidity and either turns on the other, as in the
hegemonic model described by Irigaray, or uses the threat to turn back on its self
(the disparate elements as compromising the ego’s solidity and weakening it in its
exchange with the other, and so forth). For in its linguistic exchange with the
other, the ego often employs rhetoric and wordgames to render the other—or the
‘other’ within the self—irrefutably ‘wrong’ and so sooth itself by repairing the
gape opened by the very fact of the encounter with the other. Though there is a
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violent aspect to the process of shattering the ego as well, it is a purifying
violence, a redemptive violence, and one in which language is liberated from the
interests of the ego.
The ego warps language but then, when words inevitably fail to satisfy the
ego, it denounces them and conjures fantasies of a higher reality that remains
untainted by language, a kind of prelinguistic Eden where the ego can enjoy full
satiation through direct apprehension of some deliciously solid ultimate truth.44 In
this model, a duality arises in which signifiers become the mundane and the
signified becomes the sacred: something for which humans can only grasp with
grammatical rituals, clung to desperately by those who nervously maintain that
there is something to all of this, something behind it all. In fact, there is not.
Words are not symbols of some strictly defined order of sacrality as is a crucifix,
or even a mandala, but they can seem so when Reality becomes mythic through
ego’s tireless efforts to apprehend it. In the Buddhist sense, Reality consists of the
Essential Mind described in section II; in the Lacanian sense, Reality, or the Real,
is theoretically comprised of a direct relationship to experience that is unmitigated
by language, though we have seen (and Lacan even notes) that experience as such
is never unmitigated.
Language is, in effect, all there is, not in the sense that words themselves
actually constitute objective Reality, but rather in the sense that, despite the
Buddha’s argument to the contrary in the Lankavatara Scripture,45 words can
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express Reality. That is not to say that words can signify Reality, that “Reality” as
some Thing can hold the place of signified, which is what the Buddha may have
been arguing against, but rather that each word carries the Real within it as a
balloon carries space. The Real, or Reality, itself constitutes and is constituted by
space: the space between words, the space around words, the space of breath, of
silence, the space into which we reach for the Thing whispered to us by the word
and come up empty-handed.
Around this space abides a series of tentative truths:46 that, as Saussure
taught us, differentiation is arbitrary; that differentiated units only have
significance in terms of their relationships to each other; that this system of
relationships is in constant flux. Saussure once said, “A language is a system
which is intrinsically defenseless against the factors which constantly tend to shift
relationships between signal and signification. This is one of the consequences of
the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign.”47 The arbitrariness of ‘truth,’ and
‘reality’48 (as abstractions posited by the ego) has similar consequences: the
relationships between moments, perceptions, and concepts evolve with time, as
new experiences and concepts are added to the index of self. The ego constantly
repositions itself in the light of these additions in order to assimilate them in such
a way that they do not challenge its solidity; in other words, it rationalizes the
additions in a way that minimizes the challenges they pose to the ego’s solidity.
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The staunch absolutism displayed by the ego—especially regarding the solidity of
its self and of the signifiers that its identity comprises—denies this elasticity, this
space, which the continuous flux of existence implies.
The space that I am discussing should not be considered an abstraction, as
there exist numerous examples of encounters with linguistic space. For example,
in Freud’s essay “Antithetical Sense of Primal Words,” he references with
reverence and fascination a pamphlet published by one K. Abel that describes an
ancient Egyptian language in which each word signified a thing as well as its
opposite. The pamphlet takes as a particular example the word ken, which meant,
as Abel puts it, “strongweak.” Regarding the construction Abel writes, “In reality
this word indicated neither ‘strong’ nor ‘weak,’ but the relation between the two,
and also the difference between them which created both in equal proportion
…Man has not been able to acquire even his oldest and simplest conceptions
otherwise than in contrast with their opposite; he only gradually learnt to separate
the two sides of the antithesis…”49 (Incidentally, this theory bears remarkable
resemblance to Buddhist conceptions of the evolution of differentiation.) But the
linguistic space does not always imply a space of opposition, as in the context of
Freud’s paper, but can also be simply a space of otherness. The phrase, “you are
still in the window,” from my poem The Collector, which is printed in full later in
the text, may serve as a useful example.50
The phrase can mean either that the person whom the speaker is
addressing has remained in the window for some time, or that the person is
49
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motionless in the window. If I had intended to signify directly and literally either
of the possible interpretations, I would have done so. However, in poetic
expression, such nonoppositional linguistic space can be employed to impart both
interpretations simultaneously. Every word carries something of this space and
even most non-poetic utterances have multiple meanings depending on their
contexts, but the difference between poetic and non-poetic expression is that
encounters with poetic expression can trigger an experience that transcends mere
comprehension of the intended signification of the expression, and is itself felt to
be ineffable, though it was accessed linguistically. With non-poetic expression,
the space may be acknowledged rationally, but it is not experienced affectively.
Marcel Proust encountered this space when he discovered the relationship
between language and memory in an event that Walter Benjamin recounts in his
Illuminations: “Proust, complaining of the barrenness and lack of depth in the
images of Venice that his mémoire volontaire presented to him, notes that the
very word ‘Venice’ made that wealth of images seem to him as vapid as an
exhibition of photographs.”51 Language, viz. the word Venice is connected to
Proust’s mémoire involontaire, which is the previously unconscious memorysense evoked through contact with a material object, in this case a word. Of
course, the other way to conceive of mémoire involontaire is as memoryspace,
with mémoire volontaire as the collection of moment-objects, the cluttered
narrative of selfhood. Mémoire involontaire ‘consists’ of experience that the ego
has not managed to collect and assimilate.
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It is important to remember that for the vast majority of people the ego has
complete command of conscious perception, with the result that most experience
not processed by the conscious ego impresses itself upon the unconscious
instead.52 These impressions still affect conscious experience but in ways that are
not immediately clear or scrutable to the ego. Freud wrote that the unconscious
“has no other aim than to force its way through the pressure weighing on it [by the
ego]…” As Freud notes repeatedly in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the ego is
assailed both from without and within, and with that, we’re back to Rimbaud: The
I is an other, an other for which the unconscious has little regard. When suddenly
faced with an object—including a linguistic object—that is pregnant with
memoryspace, we experience a stopmoment in which we come up against the
limits of ego-being, of a selfhood that excludes so much of what constitutes us. A
succession of these stopmoments can begin to perforate our ego-selves, but such
instances cannot be contrived by the ego, as when it reacts to emotionally
manipulative expressions like the soundtracks of many Hollywood dramas or
impassioned political proselytizing. Rather, such moments are catalyzed by
chance encounters with the linguistic object, pregnant with space.53
This space is inherent in the linguistic object; however, we have come to
see that it is continuously obscured to most of us by a constant process of
reification, whereby words are concretized and misidentified with the Things they
are supposed [/we suppose them] to signify. We imbue words with undue weight
52
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so that they become burdensome; no word or phrase feels like enough to say what
one wants to say, so we qualify words with other words and drag them behind us,
ever collecting. The space of the Real is sensed, but as something to be lamented
rather than celebrated, as an inadequacy. In Lacan’s thought, though lack
fundamentally cannot be filled, we can learn through the psychoanalytic process
to enjoy our incompleteness, to possess an awareness, rather than a fear, of our
lack. The case is similar with language. The limit of representation—the elusive
boundary between language and linguistic space—terrifies ego-beings, as it is in
actuality a limitation on the ego’s ability to represent its self, its identity, in any
concrete sense. When we cease to be motivated and conditioned by the various
forms of the ego’s paranoia, we can actually learn to enjoy the limitation of its
representability. In acknowledging openly that our languages, and subsequently
our selves, are limited, we can begin to explore the space beyond those
limitations; we can move freely in the space rather than attempting neurotically to
deny its existence. Paradoxically, the boundary that marks the space begins, in a
sense, to give way. It does not dissolve, to be sure; rather it takes on a certain
elasticity.
Through the process of what I will call dereification, we can restore
words, and—this is the crucial point—through words, selves, to this elasticity.
Dereification is the process by which the solidity—the certainty—around one’s
concepts and memories (of the mémoire volontaire) begins to soften and dissolve,
until one feels no authority or possessiveness over them, until they are weightless.
Consider the description of one form of reification in The Collector:
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Orange light sprays across your face.
You are still in the window,
chokethroated, swallowing the sharp
and blue-aired, the unlit
yet glowing squares of time—photographs
once trapped and taped to the wall, now drifting
and circling: ghostmoments.
And you,
just supposed to open your mouth to them.
To swallow and erupt them transformed
into the very cells of your being: technicolor
sphinx moths that hatch in swarms,
but die instantly in ashen piles.
And you,
just supposed to stick the tiny carcasses
to your boneframe with silver pins; to fashion
a skin of all your time. You are still
in the window, collecting your moments;
bedecking.

In this piece, moments undergo a metamorphosis within the self in which they are
transformed from dynamic moments into a past, a personal history, a vestment of
dead moments that cyclically constitute the ‘self.’ In dereification, then, the ‘self’
becomes overwhelmed. This can invoke a feeling of terror: it is as if the moths
reanimate while they are being worn and, flapping their wings, manage to
extricate themselves from their pins. At first they cover the self in swarms—
overwhelm the self, so to speak—but then, they take flight, and leave the self with
no cloak, no vestment with which to identify. The experience of selfhood ceases
to be viable. One’s claim on reality, so to speak, gives way, and what is left, if the
process is successful, is awareness in the absence of selfhood, Mind freed from
the dead weight of identity.
This absolutely can be as transgressive an experience as it may sound: this
process can be induced by certain forms of intoxication, namely psychedelic.
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Inducing dereification chemically, however, can be a gamble. One can, it is true,
experience ecstasy at the dissolution of self, but it is also possible to lose
awareness along with selfhood, and so become blathering and psychotic, or
paranoid, or vapid and dull. Also, as with any chemically induced experience, it is
temporary, and, as the self reconstitutes itself as the chemical effects wear off, it
is to easy to later consider the experience as merely a ‘trip’ and not a real
possibility for experience.
The alternative, of course, is to gradually allow the process of
dereification to unfold in a practice of meditation. In meditation, the self or ego is
not denied, as it is sometimes thought, as the denial of ‘self’ still maintains the
reality of a self in a kind of negative-reification. Instead, the workings of the
egoself are observed from the position of the (in Buddhist terms) Essential Mind,
the locus of awareness-without-self. The Lankavatara Scripture offers a
description of a process of revealing Essential Mind, one which is ultimately a
description of the dereification process described earlier: “When appearances and
names are put away and all discrimination ceases, that which remains is the true
and essential nature of things and, as nothing can be predicated as to the nature of
essence, it is called the ‘Suchness’ of Reality.”54 Suchness is essence-without-ego
(for in Buddhist terms ‘ego’ refers both to the ego-self of a human being and to
the illusory, seemingly unique characteristics of inanimate objects; that which
makes an object desirable) or, in human terms, it is awareness-without-self. This
Suchness contains and is contained within everything, but it is obscured by the
ego-self through which we see it, smell it, taste it, touch it, hear it, and—speak it.
54
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It is exactly this Suchness that is encountered in the stopmoment, as in this
untitled poem by Celan55:
Mute autumn smells. The
aster, unbent, passed
through your memory
between homeland and chasm.
A strange lostness was
bodily present, you came
near to
living.

This strange lostness, the hauntedness of the mute autumn smells—could Celan
be expressing anything other than Suchness? That he does not say so explicitly
only compounds the effect: he does not say, “Look over here, at the Suchness of
autumn, at the Suchness of your body!” Rather, he56 allows his words (even more
exquisite in the original German) and his form to carry their Suchness with them,
their ‘balloons of the Real.’
Suchness, then, like the Real or Reality, constitutes a space. It is quite
similar to the aura in Walter Benjamin’s sense, the aura being the particular
Suchness Benjamin ascribes to certain artworks prior to the possibility of their
technological reproduction, when they were located in a definite time and place.
In certain New Age spiritualities, the aura refers to the field—or space—of energy
around an individual; it is like the energetic manifestation of the person’s essence
projected beyond her physical body. The Benjaminian aura, then, could be
considered the energetic manifestation of the (original) work of art. Benjamin
himself calls it a “strange tissue of space and time: the unique apparition of a
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distance, however near it may be.”57 In his essay, “The Work of Art in the Age of
Its Technological Reproducibility,” Benjamin traces what he calls the “decline” in
the aura of the work of art. He writes, “In even the most perfect reproduction, one
thing is lacking: the here and now of the work of art—its unique existence in a
particular place.”58 Benjamin goes on to relate this temporal and spatial sense to
“authenticity,”59 to which we can also relate Suchness.
To say that this authenticity is diminished in the reproduction is therefore
akin to noting that the Suchness of the piece is diminished as well. The
reproduction takes on its own Suchness—there can be no duality of having or not
having Suchness, which is the main distinction between Suchness and Benjamin’s
aura—but this is not the Suchness of the original piece, and it is a Suchness that is
heavily obscured by function, value, desirability, and so forth. The space, in other
words, becomes filled in with arbitrary valuations. This is true not just of the artobject, but also of language. As language becomes reduced to its signifying value
and is used compulsively, its Suchness becomes increasingly overlooked by most
people, and poetic expression is seen largely as overly emotive and obsolete, or
even as something of which to be suspicious. Or, it is taken as ‘symbolic,’ as
something that needs to be decoded in order to be understood. Indeed, this is the
approach of most grade- and high school English classes, often the only places
where poetry is encountered for many people. In this context, reading poetry
becomes a chore, and whatever intuitive relationship one may feel with poetic
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expression is overlooked if it cannot be translated into the discourse of symbol
and code. To compound the effect, linguistic space is now largely appropriated by
advertising and political rhetoric, both of which use the space to manipulate both
meaning and linguistic associations in the listener or reader. Because Benjamin’s
aura suffers decline under such a system, the aura cannot be reconstructed. But
Suchness is only obscured, and can be rediscovered once the overgrowth covering
it is cleared away.
I said earlier that Suchness in language is that which induces the
stopmoment. This, too, can be set into a Benjaminian model. Benjamin writes,
“[K]nowledge comes only in lightening flashes. The text is the long roll of
thunder that follows.”60 These “flashes” are, essentially, monadic: one must
“discover in the analysis of the small individual moment the crystal of the total
event;”61 they are flashes of awareness, moments of small yet significant
awakenings, much like stopmoments. And, like stopmoments, they both spring
from and generate text. Benjamin is discussing historical text rather than poetic
expression, but the two are far from mutually exclusive. Text is the network of
passageways between each monadic flash of awareness. The nodes and passages
create a kind of scaffolding, a structure that contains and is contained within
space. This is the space, the emptiness, within and around not only every body of
text, but even every word and thing. It is the space of awakening, the pause that
allows the flash, and the space within which the flash occurs and crystallizes and
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generates. Without this pause, knowledge and language both become conformist
and compulsive; habits of thought and expression based on rule and repetition
rather than the flash of awareness. The following original poem, “Lament,” traces
the speaker’s desperation for pause:
Hurried eruptions from faces,
whispered escapes
into churning wordmills—
Anxiously we finger our pens:
take my word into your palm
and press it there.

The speaker senses that she is caught in the current of compulsive
communication, but cannot seem to release herself. There is something she yearns
to say, something beyond the scope of the compulsory system of expression and
reception, but it remains ineffable to her and unabsorbable to any reader or hearer.
This is the point in experience at which language might begin to seem unviable,
or inadequate for full expression. The compulsory model is cyclical, so that the
ineffability and unabsorbability preclude each other’s amelioration; the speaker’s
mouth is crusted over with words that no longer possess any valence. Another
poem, “Powerlines,” also expresses the agony of this particular kind of silence,
which I will call voicelessness—for this is not an open, empty silence, rather, it is
the silence that stretches like thin plastic across the face, the silence that
suffocates.
a cloud erupts from her throat
a thousand schoolfish breathing
a shadow
a murder of crows
the black music of six-a.m.-and-sleepless—
not Language only
black cries up to the milky swell—
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and suddenly they are simply
he beside her breathing
a concerto into noiselessness

gone

once in thirds with the great black mass of sound
my voice flew away
my voice perched on the
powerlines
my voice
waiting for an open throat
watching with black eyes
swallowing
no open throats

swallowing

just round staring heads frozen
mute

she lays a hand over his mouth
to start the thaw
—the black voice watching

from the powerlines

***
the crows return
his jaw tingles the world
outside
a shock of light

dries up

my voice
a crow with one white
feather

waiting for an open throat
that last slit of light sipping all the breath from the air
staring over the great grey nightway
one white
eye
my
voice
perched on the powerlines
my wind

my voice flew away
my voice

my wave
my black dying star
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Notice the increase of literal space as the poem progresses. At the beginning,
there is a marked sense of desperation—it is as if the speaker (in the italicized
lines) is crying dumbly for her voice to return, while observing that the others
around her are frozen voiceless as well. It is not a silence that pervades: as silence
is the space between moments of expression, where there is no expression, there
can be no silence either, and, subsequently, no space, which is reflected in the
form. The poem begins to open up after the lapse of time signaled by the three
asterisks; some kind of spring has arrived, and the call for the voice is now not so
much a cry as it is a mantra, not so much a struggle within voicelessness as it is an
expression of that state. It is as if the overwhelming frustration actually induces
transcendence, as sometimes occurs when dealing with unfathomable physical
pain. For in many Buddhist sects, including the Tibetan tradition that is
predominant in this project, a distinction is drawn between the body’s pain and
the mind’s reaction to it. The mind can learn how to detach itself from the pain, to
step back and calmly observe the pain rather than reacting against it mentally. By
not allowing the ego—that which ‘feels’ the pain as such; that which experiences
it as ‘my’ pain—to react defensively, the Mind essentially bypasses the ego and
the pain becomes an opportunity for meditation rather than for ego reinforcement.
In this poem, then, the mind detaches from the pain and searing frustration of
voicelessness—it ceases to resist that state—and only then is it, paradoxically,
able to express that state with a kind of melancholic beauty.
Similarly, the struggle with compulsive expression can be transmuted into
a sort of linguistic meditation on that very state. In writing, this is the moment in
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which the hands tingle, the heart beats in triplets, and a flush comes over the face,
but in which the mind is both focused and utterly detached. It is not carrying out
some conscious plan as it creates, and yet the process is, to a certain extent,
tangible and transparent to it. This Mind feels no ownership over what it creates
and yet, it takes a sort of terrified joy in it, as though the entire precious creation
might combust and disappear at any time. This awe has the potential to
completely transform one’s relationship to the self. Consider this poem by Rilke,
in which the speaker professes ignorance of and wonder at the self, and yet
manages by the end to arrive at one of the fundamental tenets of Buddhist
enlightenment:
Ignorant before the heavens of my life,
I stand and gaze in wonder. Oh the vastness
of the stars. Their rising and descent. How still.
As if I didn't exist. Do I have any
share in this? Have I somehow dispensed with
their pure effect? Does my blood's ebb and flow
change with their changes? Let me put aside
every desire, every relationship
except this one, so that my heart grows used to
its farthest spaces. Better that it live
fully aware, in the terror of its stars, than
as if protected, soothed by what is near.62

Better, indeed to live fully aware than soothed by what is near—‘what is near’
being the protective film of the ego. When the ego is pulled away, or at the very
least circumnavigated and seen beyond (because, in psychoanalytic thought, the
ego is seen not so much as something to be destroyed as it is something to be
renovated) what is left of the self may feel frighteningly vulnerable and exposed;
in Lacan’s terms, the self is forced to come face to face with its own lack, which
can bring insurmountable anguish if the person is not spiritually or
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psychologically prepared, as mentioned in the discussion of dereification above.
There is at the same time, however, the potential for sheer openness, a return to
the “basic ground” discussed by Trungpa. Through a full, meditative awareness of
the state of terror, one can actually move out of it, and toward an embrace of the
startling vastness. Energies that were previously committed to the ego’s
preservation can then, in the state of openness, be put toward play—within
physical space, within linguistic space—and unlike the ego, which is only capable
of consumption, play is truly generative. The ego devours and regurgitates words,
things, and experiences, while in play they are created spontaneously, simply
because there is something the Mind wants to express to which the existing terms,
objects, events, and so forth are not quite conducive.
When the Mind plays within linguistic space, language evolves. This is, of
course, not the only factor in its evolution; misuses that first become idiomatic
and later become accepted as the norms also contribute. But linguistic play differs
from this latter process in one quite important way. Though its results are not
generally consciously intended, linguistic play is a conscious endeavor. When a
word or phrase is misused and then assimilated, the perpetrators of the misuse
often do not know or do not care that they are speaking ‘incorrectly.’63 The player
knows, at the very least, that she is playing with language, though whatever new
permutations come out of her play may come as surprises even to her.
New compounds that use very common formal elements, such as -ness,
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-less, un-, and so forth, provide the player with an opportunity to express a
thought that has never before actually been expressed in quite that way, or, if it
has at some point throughout time, not enough to become a real part of the form
(in other words, a commonly expressed idea). Saussure posited analogy—or new
words constructed from preexisting components—as the predominant creative
force within language: “Analogy is responsible for all the normal modifications of
the external aspect of words which are not due to sound change.”64 For Saussure,
“Every time a new creation is definitely accepted and ousts its rival, there is truly
something created and something abandoned.”65 But the ‘new creation’ does not
have to be assimilated into everyday speech before it constitutes a new creation.
And, in fact, most of these new creations do not supercede older terms, rather,
they exist in parallel, and the proliferation of terms allows for increasingly precise
and intuitive expression. This is not only true of new terms formed with prefixes
and suffixes. Compounds made up of two complete words effectively fuse two
words, and therefore two sets of connotations, into one. When words follow one
another in a series (“the state of being without space”) each word qualifies the one
or ones adjacent to it, and the mind must make sense of the relationships.
Spacelessness, on the other hand, conveys one clean image: as Saussure wrote,
“We find countless cases where a change in the signal brings with it a change in
the idea expressed.”66 When two words are at play, the effect is compounded, as
in this piece, “recollections of a stepmother who has gone.”
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it’s the blue that refuses to turn or the smell
of oranges and rain that used to follow your hair like a
description—
you expand on my palm like a sponge unclutched your softness
is paralyzing I turn blue I harden
so that you can not take me in you like
to take me in these stillblue dusks
when I was four sleeping mouthbreathing you slid
a furl of paper down my throat I was a bottle
for your message a museum for your selves
tacked to the inside of my chest cavity your eyes were holes
that watched me breathe
I darkened as you watched as I
darkened my darkening
darkened your eyes we exchange
darknesses in the stillblue your eyes
are holes that watch me breathe.

I simply could not find a way to convey the static twilit glow that came over my
childhood bedroom each night in a way that suited the poem. So, I typed the poem
out on a typewriter a number of times, with each draft differing from the one that
preceded it. It was as though each time I fed a new page into the machine and
began to write, I was beginning entirely from scratch. In maybe the fifth draft,
stillblue appeared on the page. I muttered it to myself a few times and my hands
began to tingle. Constructing a particularly apt new compound can only be
described as spiritual; one has effectively given birth to an expression that would
have miscarried otherwise. The new term plays like a mantra on the Mind. The
sense is never that I created a new term; rather, it is as though it always existed in
potential and I animated it, gave it voice, called it out of its virtual existence and
into actuality. This is not to say that every author or speaker of poetic expression
is utterly detached from their creation, nor that the creative process is similar or
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even comparable among writers, but my own experience serves as an example of
a generative process of actualization.

It would be lovely—and very convenient for the sake of this project—if
there were an adroitly rational, prescriptive way in which I could conclude. In
truth, there is not. I can only urge you, my readers, to rediscover the Suchness of
language, to allow each word that you encounter to pierce the protective film of
your egos so that oppressive ego-clutter and false consciousness can be
dismantled, and replaced by a joyous embrace of space. It must be remembered
that language preceded and will outlive us, that it is the way we impart experience
to one another, and that its very transmission across time constitutes the collective
memory known as history. If we do not seize the command of our utterances from
our egos, we will forget, and perhaps even lose our inherent spiritual connection
to language, and our words will grow heavy, and lifeless, and dark. We must
remember that we can learn to receive each expression with openness, and let it
burn into us, and within us—
(Birthright)
One word recalls the span of a single present long after its death
as the flickering darkness
recalls a star who died long
before its light shot through our blinking perception—
We dance with cadavers whose voices lit the sky.
One word: contours gleaming with a holographic nowness,
each curve tasted on the tongue,
each pointed piece of space
jutting through the skin of the mouth, shattered and at once whole in itself—
They passed the flame to our mouths and died for us.
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One word echoes over the chasm between our selves and our
selves cast it into space:
moonlight exploding against a wall
and thrown back toward its waning source:
We will kiss you with this word, and you will set us
ablaze.
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Project Summary
When I began this project, I, like most honors students, had absolutely no
idea what form it would end up taking. In the four years leading up to the project
three of my interests ripened into insatiable passions: poetry, religion (particularly
Tibetan Buddhism), and psychoanalysis. I was relatively well-versed in the first
two, and had only a vague conception of the third—I’d read a good amount of
Freud’s work but had not yet thoroughly digested it, so to speak—and I knew that
the only project on which I could possibly focus for almost two years would have
to incorporate all three.
Then I encountered Lacan, and his notion of the unconscious as structured
by language. Here I was, trying to find a way to express my spiritual connection
to language, and Lacan posits that language constitutes a part of my very being. I
had the opportunity in Professor Gates’ ETS 340 class, No Such Thing, to get a
crash course in Lacanian psychoanalysis. I bought the new edition of the Ecrits,
one year (1959-60) of his seminar, and two companion books by clinician Bruce
Fink, and I dug in.
Exploring the Buddhist aspect of the project proved to be a bit trickier. I
could find no courses that corresponded to what I wanted to learn and read, so I
set off on my own…and realized that the only books available on the subject here
in Syracuse were either much too cursory or too self-help oriented (except for
Chögyam Trungpa’s work, much of which I already owned). I abhor buying
books online unless I know exactly what I need, or am buying en mass. I really
wanted to browse through a variety of in-depth, preferably primary, texts on the
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subject. Luckily, I had the opportunity when I took a cross-country road trip over
the winter of 2008-9 and ended up in Boulder, CO, arguably the Mecca of Tibetan
Buddhism in America. Here I found the “Buddhist Bible,” a collection of sutras
translated from Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese, edited by Dwight Goddard, which
proved most useful. I also discovered a few other texts that served as excellent
background reading.
I wanted the project to be a patchwork of sorts. I knew that I was working
with at least three separate discourses, and I wanted to leave them mostly intact; I
did not want to reduce Buddhism and psychoanalysis, for example, to a series of
vague parallels, and yet I did want to show the connections between them. This
was a difficult balance to strike, especially when, through conversations with my
advisor, Dr. M. Gail Hamner, Deleuze’s text on Bergson and various works of
Benjamin’s were added into the equation. Dr. Hamner recommended that I use
Deleuze’s Bergsonism to frame my use of the terms real, virtual and actual. Upon
reading the text, I knew I wanted to use it in the introduction, but there was one
issue. I was already using the word real in at least three separate senses: in
Lacan’s sense, in which the ‘Real’ is that order of existence that remains
untouched and unmediated by language (or, in Lacan’s terms, by the ‘Symbolic’);
in the Buddhist sense, in which the highest ‘Reality’ refers to what is experienced
by the enlightened Mind; and in the colloquial sense, where ‘reality’ refers to the
tangible environment. Introducing Deleuze’s text added yet another usage of the
term into the project (real:possible::actual:virtual). On the one hand, I was
enchanted with the plurality of uses and meanings that could be attributed to one
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word; it seemed a perfect example of the linguistic space that I discuss in the
project. On the other hand, there was still the issue of keeping all the usages
straight and presenting them in a way such that each distinct usage was clear.
In Benjamin’s case, I felt a deep kinship with his work from the moment I
encountered it, when I took Dr. Hamner’s REL 600 Religion and Revolution
seminar in the fall of my junior year—so much so that I took a Benjamin seminar
through the honors department in the spring semester of my senior year. As I
mentioned above, most of Benjamin’s work focuses on culture and history, and,
subsequently, on memory and text. He was writing in Germany in the 1920s and
30s, during Hitler’s rise to power. Benjamin sought to deconstruct the narrative,
progress-driven conception of history—what he labeled ‘Historicism’—that
prevailed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, because he saw this
version of history as culminating, ultimately, in Fascism. Benjamin counters
Historicism with what he calls ‘historical materialism,’ in which the historical
narrative is torn open so that the lost moments—those that did not fit into the
narrative and were consequently forgotten—can shine through. Benjamin’s model
of history is, then, more constellatory than linear, and it is a model in which the
importance of (and truth within) space is constantly reiterated, whether it is the
space among the moment-stars that comprise the constellation or the space among
thoughts, or words. I found Benjamin’s work very useful in discussing linguistic
space.
The Spiritual Value of Poetic Expression is really a lifework of sorts (at
least, so far). Poetry has been my best-liked and yet my most fickle companion
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since I was about six years old. I never felt as though I had complete command
over my writing. It felt instead as though I was a channel or medium through
which the poems could come alive and take flight. When I first read Freud’s
description of the oceanic feeling, I immediately understood it, for it was how I’d
always felt toward language—like it was something so vast and enigmatic that all
I could do was stand in front of it in awe, and sometimes take a nighttime swim: I
pictured words sticking to my skin like bioluminescent plankton. Poetry and
spirituality have always been inextricable from one another for me, and this
brought me to poets like Rilke and Celan, both of whom write poems that are, in a
sense, psalms or sutras. In this project, I wanted to analyze what it is about poetic
expression that makes it so conducive to spiritual ecstasy, despair and
detachment.

